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NOTES
THE POLITICAL AND SOCIAL CHANGE DRIVEN
BY PROTEST: THE NEED TO REFORM THE
ANTI-RIOT ACT AND EXAMINE ANTI-RIOT
PROVISIONS
Ronald E. Britt II*
The right to join in peaceful assembly and petition is critical to an effective
democracy and is at the core of the First Amendment. The assault of peaceful
protestors in the pursuit of racial justice is not a new phenomenon, and
legislators at the federal and state levels have drafted anti-riot provisions as
a measure to target protestors they deem an existential threat to American
society. As these provisions have become increasingly prevalent in light of
the protests following the murders of Breonna Taylor and George Floyd, they
have the likelihood of severely chilling the effect on protestors’ right to
freedom of expression.
This Note examines these effects, considering the Anti-Riot Act of 1968’s
intent to protect the public from violent protestors and, in light of
congressional inaction due to ongoing political polarization, asks whether
presidential intervention is warranted. More specifically, this Note
determines whether the Act’s current interpretation meets Congress’s intent
or subverts the constitutional right to freedom of expression. This Note
contends that while persuasive arguments exist both in support for harsher
anti-riot provisions and for a novel approach to address public safety, these
arguments tend to rely on anecdotal evidence due to the limited scholarship
on this topic. Therefore, this Note argues that the president should establish
a commission to comprehensively investigate the recent outbreaks of racially
motivated protests before potentially moving forward with executive action.
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INTRODUCTION
“At this point it’s bigger than Breonna, it’s bigger than just Black Lives.”1
In the spring and summer of 2020, two events were a catalyst for change that
erupted into wide-scale demonstrations across the nation.2 In March 2020,
Breonna Taylor and Kenneth Walker were asleep in their bed when
plainclothes police officers in Louisville, Kentucky executed a no-knock
warrant on Ms. Taylor’s apartment.3 The warrant was approved based on an
investigation into Jamarcus Glover, who the police believed was utilizing her
residence as a means to receive packages of drugs.4 Shortly after midnight,
the officers forcefully entered Ms. Taylor’s apartment without warning. 5 Mr.

1. Richard A. Oppel Jr. et al., What to Know About Breonna Taylor’s Death,
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 26, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/breonna-taylor-police.html
[https://perma.cc/BZA3-FFSS]; see Larry Buchanan et al., Black Lives Matter May Be the
Largest Movement in U.S. History, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2020/07/03/us/george-floyd-protests-crowd-size.html
[https://perma.cc/629DQVS7]; Patrisse Cullors, ‘Black Lives Matter’ Is About More than the Police, ACLU (June
23, 2020), https://www.aclu.org/news/criminal-law-reform/black-lives-matter-is-about-morethan-the-police/ [https://perma.cc/857G-ZLH7].
2. See Oppel Jr. et al., supra note 1.
3. Id.; Breonna Taylor: What Happened on the Night of Her Death?, BBC
(Oct. 8, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-54210448 [https://perma.cc/
9CVA-BG4D].
4. See Oppel Jr. et al., supra note 1.
5. Anna North & Fabiola Cineas, The Police Shooting Death of Breonna Taylor,
Explained, VOX (July 13, 2020, 12:36 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/5/13/
21257457/breonna-taylor-louisville-shooting-ahmaud-arbery-justiceforbreonna
[https://perma.cc/VDU2-K9MN]; see Piper Hudspeth Blackburn, Breonna Taylor’s Death: A
Push to Limit No-Knock Warrants, AP NEWS (Mar. 30, 2021), https://apnews.com/
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Walker fired his gun believing that intruders entered, striking one of the
police officers.6
In response, the three officers leading the raid
indiscriminately fired numerous bullets into the apartment, with stray bullets
entering a neighboring apartment.7 Afterward, Mr. Walker realized that Ms.
Taylor was struck five times while still in her bed, and she ultimately died
from her wounds.8 Despite the foreseeable outrage over Ms. Taylor’s death,
no national response followed until an online campaign began over social
media with the hashtag “#SayHerName,” demanding that the officers be held
accountable for their actions.9
On May 25, 2020, George Floyd, a Black man, was arrested by Derek
Chauvin, a Minneapolis police officer, for allegedly buying cigarettes with a
counterfeit twenty-dollar bill.10 After arresting Mr. Floyd, Officer Chauvin
reported that Mr. Floyd was not complying with another officer’s commands,
so he detained Mr. Floyd on the street with his knee on Mr. Floyd’s neck.11
Officer Chauvin pinned his knee on Mr. Floyd’s neck for nearly nine
minutes, during which Mr. Floyd repeatedly pleaded that he could not
breathe, before eventually losing consciousness and dying. 12 In contrast to
Ms. Taylor’s murder,13 this fatal incident was captured on video by local
witnesses and immediately broadcasted across all major national and global
news networks.14 The effect from this concerted media presence instantly

article/breonna-taylor-shootings-police-legislation-police-brutalityc7f765369c398583fe48dc6dba945d14 [https://perma.cc/AN7Y-F4TS].
6. North & Cineas, supra note 5; see Tessa Duvall & Darcy Costello, Louisville Police
Pursued ‘No-Knock’ Search Warrant, LOUISVILLE COURIER J. (Jan. 22, 2021, 8:19 PM),
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/2020/05/12/breonna-taylor-louisville-emt-notmain-target-drug-investigation/3115928001/ [https://perma.cc/D5KC-A3BL].
7. See Oppel Jr. et al., supra note 1.
8. Id.
9. See Christina Carrega & Sabina Ghebremedhin, Timeline: Inside the Investigation of
Breonna Taylor’s Killing and Its Aftermath, ABC NEWS (Nov. 17, 2020, 2:31 PM),
https://abcnews.go.com/US/timeline-inside-investigation-breonna-taylors-killingaftermath/story?id=71217247 [https://perma.cc/43UY-R6BG]; Melissa Brown & Rashawn
Ray, Breonna Taylor, Police Brutality, and the Importance of #SayHerName, BROOKINGS
INST. (Sept. 25, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/how-we-rise/2020/09/25/breonnataylor-police-brutality-and-the-importance-of-sayhername/ [https://perma.cc/MY3Y-AMZ3];
Breonna Taylor: Protesters Call on People to ‘Say Her Name,’ BBC (June 7, 2020),
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52956167 [https://perma.cc/X6GV-BNQS].
10. See Evan Hill et al., How George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 24, 2022), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html
[https://perma.cc/72VG-BC3K]; Bill Chappell, Cashier Says He Offered to Pay After
Realizing Floyd’s $20 Bill Was Fake, NPR (Mar. 31, 2021, 12:46 PM), https://www.npr.org/
sections/trial-over-killing-of-george-floyd/2021/03/31/983089623/watch-live-cashier-sayshe-offered-to-pay-after-realizing-floyds-20-bill-was-fak
[https://perma.cc/FX3A-YCT8];
Luis Andres Henao et al., For George Floyd, A Complicated Life and Consequential Death,
AP
NEWS
(Apr.
20,
2021),
https://apnews.com/article/george-floyd-profile66163bbd94239afa16d706bd6479c613 [https://perma.cc/6WN8-M85G].
11. See Hill et al., supra note 10.
12. Id.
13. See Oppel Jr. et al., supra note 1 (noting that no body cameras were used by the police
officers during the raid).
14. Id.
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advanced the narrative on racial inequality and the lack of police
accountability that impacts the Black community.15
On May 26, 2020, hundreds of protestors flooded the Minneapolis streets
calling for justice.16 The next day, protests erupted in cities across the
country, where demonstrators called for justice after the consistent murders
by police officers and vigilantes, such as the murder of Ahmaud Arbery in
Georgia.17 On May 28, 2020, Minnesota Governor Tim Walz activated
thousands of National Guard troops to respond to acts of vandalism and fires
that broke out during the demonstrations.18 Governor Walz stated that
vandalism befalling Minneapolis “is about attacking civil society, [and]
instilling fear.”19
As protests spread across the country, state governments responded with a
comparatively high degree of force.20 Police officers, augmented with
military equipment and full riot gear, descended on cities, oftentimes
deploying threatening tactics to disperse the crowds.21 In Memphis, officers
dressed in riot gear emerged on horseback and positioned military vehicles
to restrict protestors.22 In Los Angeles, a citywide tactical alert was issued,
with helicopters circling over the protestors to provide crowd control.23 In
Georgia, Governor Brian Kemp declared a state of emergency and activated
nearly 500 National Guard troops to respond to the hundreds of
demonstrators flooding the streets of Atlanta.24 At the same time,
conservative armed militia groups, anti-vaccination groups, and other
15. See Kim Parker et al., Amid Protests, Majorities Across Racial and Ethnic Groups
Express Support for the Black Lives Matter Movement, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 12, 2020),
https://www.pewresearch.org/social-trends/2020/06/12/amid-protests-majorities-acrossracial-and-ethnic-groups-express-support-for-the-black-lives-matter-movement/
[https://perma.cc/2KYB-RT52] (finding that “[m]ost Americans say they’ve had
conversations about race or racial equality” as a reaction to Floyd’s death); see infra Part II.B.
16. Timeline:
Death of George Floyd, Reactions and Protests, FOX 9
(May 27, 2020, 9:42 PM), https://www.fox9.com/news/timeline-death-of-george-floydreactions-and-protests [https://perma.cc/6Z9K-QMT3].
17. Derrick Bryson Taylor, George Floyd Protests:
A Timeline, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 5, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/article/george-floyd-protests-timeline.html
[https://perma.cc/HV4R-ZD9S].
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id. (acknowledging police officers utilizing tear gas, pepper spray, flash-bangs, rubber
bullets, and beanbag rounds).
22. Desiree Stennett et al., Memphis Protests: Demonstrators Confront Law Enforcement
Throughout Sunday Night, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL (June 1, 2020, 8:51 AM),
https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/2020/05/31/george-floyd-memphis-protestsmay-31/5283558002/ [https://perma.cc/3YKB-R49R].
23. Matthew Ormseth et al., Protesters, Law Enforcement Clash in Downtown L.A.
During Protest over George Floyd’s Death, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 5, 2021, 10:06 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2020-05-27/protestors-block-the-101-freeway
[https://perma.cc/8KE7-HXD4].
24. Richard Fausset & Michael Levenson, Atlanta Protesters Clash with Police as Mayor
Warns ‘You Are Disgracing Our City,’ N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/29/us/atlanta-protest-cnn-george-floyd.html
[https://perma.cc/JW43-2FY6].
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elements of the radical right organized nationwide protests opposing
COVID-19 restrictions25 and were met with a comparatively mild response
from police.26
The federal government’s response to the Breonna Taylor and George
Floyd protests was fragmented. As the protests intensified, then President
Donald Trump threatened to deploy military troops, but this action was
thwarted by his senior advisors since this level of federal intervention has
“rarely [been] seen in modern American history.”27 Instead, President
Trump signed an executive order to “ensure domestic tranquility” and to hold
the alleged rioters from “left-wing extremists” groups, who had traveled
across state lines, criminally liable for “promot[ing] their . . . violent
agenda.”28 Moreover, Republican lawmakers in federal and state legislatures
began amending current riot provisions and drafting new bills with the intent
to target protestors advocating for policy changes related to discrimination
and racially motivated violence.29
The institutional assault of peaceful protestors in the pursuit of racial
justice is not a new phenomenon.30 Marginalized communities continuously
face systemic problems, and the ability to peacefully protest and promote
activism is vital to “meaningfully address[ing] . . . [our nation’s] . . . ills.”31
Though the destruction of property and looting should be condemned,
25. See generally Michael Martina et al., How Trump Allies Have Organized and
Promoted Anti-Lockdown Protests, REUTERS (Apr. 21, 2020, 7:56 PM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-trump-protests-idUSKCN2233ES
[https://perma.cc/Q3TU-NWT7]; Jason Wilson, The Rightwing Groups Behind Wave of
Protests
Against
Covid-19
Restrictions,
GUARDIAN
(Apr.
17,
2020),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/17/far-right-coronavirus-protests-restrictions
[https://perma.cc/62LX-MDU9]; Coronavirus Lockdown Protest: What’s Behind the US
Demonstrations?, BBC (Apr. 21, 2020), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada52359100 [https://perma.cc/RWP5-X8G8]. See also Amanda Moreland et al., Timing of State
and Territorial COVID-19 Stay-at-Home Orders and Changes in Population Movement—
United States, March 1–May 31, 2020, 69 CDC MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1198,
1198 (2020) (describing that “mandatory stay-at-home orders can help reduce activities
associated with the spread of COVID-19, including population movement and close
person-to-person contact outside the household”).
26. See Li Zhou & Kainaz Amaria, These Photos Capture the Stark Contrast in Police
Response to the George Floyd Protests and the Anti-Lockdown Protests, VOX (May 27, 2020,
4:50 PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/5/27/21271811/george-floyd-protests-minneapolislockdown-protests [https://perma.cc/TMA4-TZPN]; Aymann Ismail, The Anti-Lockdown
Protests Prove Police Know How to Treat Protesters Fairly, SLATE (May 28, 2020, 7:38 PM),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2020/05/police-response-george-floyd-minneapolisshutdowns.html [https://perma.cc/TRV9-MTH9].
27. Darlene Superville et al., Trump Threatens Military Force Against Protesters
Nationwide, AP NEWS (June 2, 2020), https://apnews.com/article/mo-state-wire-in-state-wiremi-state-wire-election-2020-virus-outbreak-a2797b342b4fc509e43f404817a56aa9
[https://perma.cc/DHN7-83DR].
28. Exec. Order No. 13,933, 85 Fed. Reg. 40,081 (June 26, 2020), revoked by Exec. Order
No. 14,029, 85 Fed. Reg. 27,025 (May 14, 2021).
29. See infra Part II.B.
30. See Tasnim Motala, “Foreseeable Violence” & Black Lives Matter: How Mckesson
Can Stifle a Movement, 73 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 61, 64 (2020).
31. John E. Taylor, Reflecting on the Death of George Floyd, W. VA. LAW., Autumn 2020,
at 8, 9.
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protests can also be interpreted as a sign of the “fraying of our social
contract.”32
Over fifty years before the murders of Ms. Taylor and Mr. Floyd, the
country found itself in a similar period of social unrest due to prevalent
societal inequalities in the communities of Black Americans, known as the
“long, hot summer [of 1967].”33 In response, President Lyndon B. Johnson
established the Kerner Commission to investigate the eruption of protests
across the nation.34 The Kerner Commission concluded that “white society”
was to blame for the riots.35 This inference irritated President Johnson and
infuriated members of Congress who wanted to blame the rioting and looting
on “outside agitators.”36 As President Johnson was striving to pass the Civil
Rights Act of 1968,37 the Kerner Report was cited regularly by members of
Congress who were arguing against its accuracy and instead promoting a
narrative that Black activists were the source of rioting emerging across the
nation.38 In response, the Anti-Riot Act39 (the “Act”) was included in the
Civil Rights Act of 1968 as a measure for federal authorities to target
protestors they deemed an existential threat to American society.40 The
emerging dangers addressed by the Kerner Report, for example, dealt with
revitalizing failed education, social services, and housing policies.41 In
contrast, the Act was a tool utilized in response to impending crises.42
However, legislators have questioned the Act’s constitutionality after a
noticeably rising tide of protesting across the nation.43
The parallels between then and now invite the question of whether another
commission is necessary. The consideration is this: To what avail is another
presidential commission warranted today given the failure of the Kerner
Commission? Moreover, is addressing the Act’s racialized legislative history
effective in developing a contemporary response to rioting?44 Generally, the
president’s ability to persuade Congress to support divisive initiatives—for
example, on issues related to race—is dependent on substantial public
32. Id.
33. See generally Kathleen Weldon, The Long Hot Summer: Riots in 1967, CORNELL
UNIV. ROPER CTR. (Aug. 28, 2017), https://ropercenter.cornell.edu/blog/long-hot-summerriots-1967 [https://perma.cc/MS3B-J8Q3].
34. See NAT’L ADVISORY COMM’N ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS (1967) [hereinafter KERNER REPORT],
https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/national-advisory-commission-civildisorders-report [https://perma.cc/B5RK-R958].
35. See id. at 5.
36. See Hugh Davis Graham, The Ambiguous Legacy of American Presidential
Commissions, 7 PUB. HISTORIAN 5, 15–16 (1985); see also infra Part I.C.
37. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (codified as amended in scattered sections of the
U.S.C.).
38. See infra notes 110–11 and accompanying text.
39. Civil Obedience Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, tit. X, 82 Stat. 73, 90–92.
40. See discussion infra Part I.C.
41. See KERNER REPORT, supra note 34, at 11–14; see infra Part I.A.
42. See infra notes 114–17 and accompanying text.
43. See infra Part II.B.2.
44. See generally Recent Case, United States v. Miselis, 972 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2020),
134 HARV. L. REV. 2614 (2021).
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support.45 When evaluating commissions, the public balances whether
significant recommendations can be implemented without creating the
appearance of taking some vague action.46
On the other hand, although Congress can enact meaningful policy
reform,47 others argue that Congress’s failure to follow the Kerner
Commission’s recommendations over fifty years ago, either due to “paralysis
of analysis” or fear of political fallout, is still indicative of the response
legislators would have today.48 Yet, given these varying views on the federal
government, the efficacy of presidential commissions should not be
diminished, especially when political polarization has led to congressional
inaction on drafting meaningful policy reform.49 However, much of the issue
stems from limited scholarship on this topic and a distorted view of how to
reasonably prevent violent civil disturbances.50
In an effort to resolve these concerns, this Note examines whether the
Act’s impact deserves direct review by the president of the United States.
More precisely, it seeks to determine whether the current interpretation of the
Act meets Congress’s intent when drafting the Act and whether this
interpretation subverts the constitutional right to freedom of expression.
Part I examines the Kerner Commission, a key contextual investigation
into the causes of race riots following the “long, hot summer of 1967”51 that
recommended necessary preventative measures to control future violent
protests. Part I also reviews relevant legislative history to understand
Congress’s intent when it quickly passed the Act in 1968. Part II analyzes
the varied interpretations of the Act across the three branches of the federal
government. It considers the Act’s effects on racially diverse protests and
reviews arguments as to whether the Act is compatible with Congress’s
intended protections from violent protests. Finally, Part III contends that the
executive branch would be the most effective branch to address this issue and
proposes that the president should establish a commission to
comprehensively investigate the recent outbreaks of racially motivated
protests before potentially moving forward with executive action.
I. THE RESTRICTIONS ON PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress
shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for
a redress of grievances.”52 The third, fourth, and fifth clauses of the First
45. See generally Graham, supra note 36, at 22–25.
46. See id.
47. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
48. Patrick Dankwa John, Reparations: 40 Acres and a Mule . . . With Interest, CBA
REC., July/Aug. 2021, at 35, 37.
49. See infra Part III.A.
50. See infra Part I.C.
51. Corinna Barrett Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero?: Rethinking the Warren
Court’s Role in the Criminal Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1428 (2004).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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Amendment are referred to as the Freedom of Speech Clause,53 the Assembly
Clause,54 and the Petition Clause,55 respectively.56 The general proposition
that the Freedom of Speech Clause, Assembly Clause, and Petition Clause
are secured in the “freedom of expression,” has long been settled by the U.S.
Supreme Court.57 The Court has interpreted the constitutional guarantee of
freedom of expression to be vital in protecting an “uninhibited debate on
important political and social issues.”58
These rights are not absolute59 and are subject to reasonable restriction as
to time and place of exercise,60 to safeguard public interest,61 and ensure
public safety and order.62 Indeed, the Court’s finding that the Assembly
Clause and Petition Clause encompass peaceful demonstrations63 has led to
interpretations of broad statutes aimed at preventing the incitement of
violence and crime as placing necessary restrictions on upholding public
peace.64 However, the power to abridge these rights “must find its
justification in a reasonable apprehension of danger to organized
government.”65 These rights may not be abridged because police and
municipal authorities believe or are afraid that some “unpleasantness or . . .
damage to property . . . might possibly occur.”66
In determining what constitutes actions likely to incite violence, the
Supreme Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio67 established a two-part test for
evaluating inciteful speech that advocates the use of force or illegal activity.68
This constraint on speech has led to a discussion as to whether this protection
is constitutional as it specifically relates to the Act and whether there is a

53. See Moore v. City of Kilgore, 877 F.2d 364, 370 (5th Cir. 1989).
54. See Bourgeois v. Peters, 387 F.3d 1303, 1311 (11th Cir. 2004).
55. See Kottle v. Nw. Kidney Ctrs., 146 F.3d 1056, 1059 (9th Cir. 1998).
56. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cls. 3–5.
57. See Nat’l Rev., Inc. v. Mann, 140 S. Ct. 344, 346–47 (2019) (Alito, J., dissenting);
Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451–52 (2011); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
270 (1964).
58. See Nat’l Rev., Inc., 140 S. Ct. at 346; NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429–31
(1963).
59. See Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 398–99 (1950).
60. See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 573 (1965).
61. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 305–06 (1940); Frohwerk v. United States,
249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919).
62. See Cox, 379 U.S. at 574.
63. Id.
64. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573–74 (1942).
65. Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937).
66. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund v. Shands, 440 F.2d 44, 46 (4th Cir. 1971).
67. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
68. Id. at 447 (noting that the government may prohibit speech advocating the use of force
or crime if such speech is “directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is
likely to incite or produce such action”); see infra Part II.A.1.
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“significant harm . . . worth preventing,”69 since courts have found
incitement-to-riot provisions constitutionally problematic.70
This part reviews the history of executive and legislative responses in
combating violent civil disturbances following the civil rights movement in
the 1960s. Part I.A discusses the formation and purpose of the Kerner
Commission during the Johnson administration. Part I.B assesses the utility
of a presidential commission. Part I.C then outlines the relevant legislative
history of the Anti-Riot Act.
A. The Kerner Commission Report
During the summer of 1967, there was an outburst of riots involving
“sustained and widespread looting and destruction of property” that took
place in more than 150 cities.71 This chaos eventually erupted in Newark,
New Jersey and Detroit, Michigan and came to be known as the “long, hot
summer of 1967,” during which Black Americans protested in response to
abusive policing, the lack of access to decent housing, and a generational lack
of economic mobility.72 Many Americans blamed the riots on outside
agitators or young Black men who were the most visible participants among
the publicized groups.73 An inaccurate coverage of the disturbances by the
media led to millions of Americans incorrectly believing the disturbances
were “uncontrolled and irrational spasms of reckless violence . . . [that were
the] result of a breakdown of respect for authority.”74 Moreover, pundits
proposed that the imbalance between reality and impression resulted from
conservatives and mainstream media outlets viewing such actions as a
breakdown of respect for the law, while liberals saw the actions as resulting
from unrest due to racism and economic disadvantages.75

69. See Margot E. Kaminski, Incitement to Riot in the Age of Flash Mobs, 81 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1, 36 (2012).
70. Id. at 10; see Marvin Zalman, The Federal Anti-Riot Act and Political Crime: The
Need for Criminal Law Theory, 20 VILL. L. REV. 897, 921–24 (1975); Recent Case, supra note
44, at 2616–18.
71. See KERNER REPORT, supra note 34, at 15; Alice George, The 1968 Kerner
Commission Got It Right, but Nobody Listened, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Mar. 1, 2018),
https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smithsonian-institution/1968-kerner-commission-got-itright-nobody-listened-180968318/ [https://perma.cc/XWR9-PD7G].
72. See KERNER REPORT, supra note 34, at 15–16; Clyde Haberman, The 1968 Kerner
Commission Report Still Echoes Across America, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/23/us/kerner-commission-report.html
[https://perma.cc/VZ8K-VJJV]. See generally Steven M. Gillon, Why the 1967 Kerner Report
on Urban Riots Suppressed Its Own Expert Findings, HIST. (Jan. 31, 2019),
https://www.history.com/news/race-riots-kerner-commission-findings-suppressed-lbj
[https://perma.cc/7NKA-SK5B].
73. See George, supra note 71.
74. See Gillon, supra note 72; see also KERNER REPORT, supra note 34, at 201–02.
75. See Gillon, supra note 72. See generally KERNER REPORT, supra note 34, at 202
(noting that millions of Americans formed incorrect impressions and judgments about the
disorder in the summer of 1967 because the media sensationalized the disturbances and
consistently overplayed violence).
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Americans were alarmed with the staggering amount of protests occurring
throughout the summer, and President Johnson undertook executive action.76
On July 29, 1967, President Johnson issued Executive Order 11,365,
establishing the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders77
(“Kerner Commission”), for the purpose of exploring “the roots of the [civil]
unrest and possible remedies.”78 The commission was comprised of three
groups: (1) researchers who gathered evidence and spoke with local leaders
in the cities, (2) social scientists who handled the information and searched
for patterns, and (3) eleven commissioners “who approved the final report.”79
The eleven-member commission was directly appointed by President
Johnson, led by Governor Otto Kerner of Illinois, and included two Black
members: Senator Edward Brooke of Massachusetts, the only African
American Senator, and Mr. Roy Wilkins, the executive director of the
National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP).80
To accurately examine President Johnson’s inquiries, the investigators
visited a dozen cities81 to interview hundreds of Black residents, activists,
and community leaders to better understand the uneasy relations between
Black communities and the police.82 The research occurred over seven
months, and the Kerner Commission’s final report, the Kerner Report, was
completed and presented to President Johnson on March 1, 1968.83 The
Kerner Report was over 400 pages and included three parts: “What
Happened?”84; “Why Did It Happen?”85; and “What Can Be Done?”86

76. See KERNER REPORT, supra note 34, at 201–03.
77. Exec. Order No. 11,365, 32 Fed. Reg. 11,111 (Aug. 1, 1967).
78. Haberman, supra note 72.
79. See Gillon, supra note 72; see also KERNER REPORT, supra note 34, at 15–16.
80. KERNER REPORT, supra note 34, at 298–99.
81. The cities visited are: Tampa, Florida; Cincinnati, Ohio; Atlanta, Georgia; Newark,
New Jersey; Elizabeth, New Jersey; Englewood, New Jersey; Jersey City, New Jersey;
Plainfield, New Jersey; New Brunswick, New Jersey; and Detroit, Michigan. See KERNER
REPORT, supra note 34, at 22–47.
82. Id.; Gwen Prowse & Vesla Mae Weaver, How a 50-Year-Old Report Predicted
America’s Current Racial Reckoning, VOX (June 24, 2020, 10:40 AM), https://www.vox.com/
first-person/2020/6/24/21299649/george-floyd-protests-police-brutality-kerner-commission
[https://perma.cc/997E-ZJPQ]. See generally Haberman, supra note 72.
83. See Marcus Casey & Bradley Hardy, 50 Years After the Kerner Commission Report,
the Nation Is Still Grappling with Many of the Same Issues, BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 25, 2018),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2018/09/25/50-years-after-the-kerner-commissionreport-the-nation-is-still-grappling-with-many-of-the-same-issues/ [https://perma.cc/K8KCXKHK].
84. KERNER REPORT, supra note 34, at 2–5 (containing accounts of the “disorders that
took place during the summer of 1967 . . . indicat[ing] how the disorders happened, who
participated in them, and how local officials, police forces, and the National Guard
responded”).
85. Id. at 5–7 (focusing on the national scene, “from the particular events of the summer
of 1967 to the factors within the society at large that created a mood of violence among many
urban Negroes”).
86. Id. at 8–13 (establishing that “virtually every major episode of violence was
foreshadowed by an accumulation of unresolved grievances and by widespread dissatisfaction
among Negroes with the unwillingness or inability of local government to respond”).
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The Kerner Report concluded that the “[n]ation is moving toward two
societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.”87 The Kerner
Commission argued that the legislative successes with the Civil Rights Act
of 196488 and the Voting Rights Act of 196589 were not reflected in the daily
lives of African Americans facing police misconduct, economic inequality,
segregated housing, and inferior education.90 It outlined and advocated for
numerous responses to suppress the rioting, including “large-scale, targeted
government investment in housing, education, and employment programs,
and more robust social insurance programs.”91
Despite these warnings, scholars infer that President Johnson ultimately
chose to ignore the Kerner Commission’s findings because it implied “that
the Great Society programs [he engineered] had not made much of a dent in
the urban and racial problem.”92
B. Competing Views on Presidential Commissions
Scholars have argued whether presidential commissions are an effective
mechanism for providing expert advice on public policy matters.93 The
success or impact of a commission has largely been measured by the
president’s public support and clear policy proposals.94 Furthermore,
commissions allow presidents to “formulate innovative domestic policies” in
their desire to effectuate new policy directives for the nation.95 However, a
commission’s ultimate effectiveness and impact depends largely on the
president’s subsequent actions, due to its fundamental role as an advisory
group.96 While presidential support does not guarantee that Congress will
accept the commission’s recommendations, “the absence of such support . . .
reduces the chances that a commission[’s findings] will . . . convert[] into . . .
executive or legislative action.”97 Thus, commissions are usually effective
when the “character and influence” of a president’s administration are
87. Id. at 1.
88. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28, 42,
and 52 U.S.C.).
89. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 and
52 U.S.C.).
90. See KERNER REPORT, supra note 34, at 109–13; George, supra note 71.
91. Casey & Hardy, supra note 83 (noting that the Kerner Commission predicted that
without immediate action rioting would most likely continue).
92. Graham, supra note 36, at 16; see STEPHANIE SMITH, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL87668,
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSIONS: THEIR PURPOSE AND IMPACT 1–2 (1987) (noting the importance
of a presidential commission to elicit public support in favor of a president’s policy).
93. Compare SMITH, supra note 92, at 2 (contending that presidential commissions “by
virtue of their ad hoc status . . . [can] circumvent the normal bureaucratic channels”), with
David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of
Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1095, 1120–22 (2008) (noting a cause for
concern in the politicization of presidential appointments since the appointees would likely
recite the president’s personal views).
94. See SMITH, supra note 92, at 48–49.
95. Id. at 46.
96. Id. at 48.
97. Id. at 48–49.
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convincing to the public and when it is politically feasible for the
administration to consult with Congress.98
Professor Amy B. Zegart contextualizes this by arguing that “members of
Congress, interest groups, and voters are more attentive to and vested in
domestic policy issues,” and the active role of Congress requires the
president to aggressively “sell” his agenda.99 She explains that commissions
are needed to supplement a president’s inexperience in social and political
issues and that the three ideal types of commissions100 and their core
functions are strategically employed to address the president’s different
policy issues.101 Professor Zegart posits that presidents use commissions to
gather critical information for imminent policy decisions because, while most
conventional views on presidential commissions believe that such action
produces no substantive change or shifts the issues off the president’s agenda,
they are an important function for the president to recognize and grapple with
significant matters.102
One weakness of presidential commissions is their inability to enact
legislation. As previously mentioned, the effectiveness of commissions
requires executive and congressional support to be successful.103 The Kerner
Commission’s recommendations104 would only have been successful if the
political branches of government agreed on a manner to equitably achieve its
purpose of preventing violent civil disturbances and maintaining citizens’
constitutional rights to peacefully assemble and petition the government.105
As the next section will demonstrate, the lack of President Johnson’s support
for the Kerner Report led Congress to swiftly draft legislation addressing the
lack of federal protections against rioting.
C. Legislative History of the Anti-Riot Act
The Anti-Riot Act was passed as a rider to the Civil Rights Act of 1968.106
Throughout the 1960s, members of Congress considered the need for
anti-riot legislation, despite such legislation already existing at the state
level.107 Initially, Congress could not identify an even-handed approach to
98. Id. at 53.
99. Amy B. Zegart, Blue Ribbons, Black Boxes: Toward a Better Understanding of
Presidential Commissions, 34 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 366, 378–79 (2004).
100. Zegart identifies three “ideal” kinds of commissions: (1) agenda commissions, which
generate support for the president’s initiatives and target a mass audience; (2) information
commissions, which provide new facts and thinking about policies and target government
officials; and (3) political constellation commissions, which seek to foster consensus among
competing interests and target commission members themselves. Id. at 375 fig.2.
101. See id. at 389.
102. Id. at 390.
103. See SMITH, supra note 92, at 48–49.
104. See supra notes 84–90 and accompanying text.
105. See Zegart, supra note 99 and accompanying text.
106. Char Adams, Experts Call ‘Anti-Protest’ Bills a Backlash to 2020’s Racial Reckoning,
NBC NEWS (May 18, 2021, 1:46 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/nbcblk/experts-callanti-protest-bills-backlash-2020-s-racial-reckoning-n1267781
[https://perma.cc/D3LG2QNZ].
107. See Zalman, supra note 70, at 911–13.
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address the riots.108 Senators Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and Frank
Lausche of Ohio initially argued that an anti-riot amendment was needed to
“protect society from the extremist element which advocates the destruction
of our Nation.”109 Senators Thurmond and Lausche subsequently introduced
an expansive anti-riot proposal on March 4, 1968,110 that swiftly passed
through the Senate on March 11, 1968, with minor amendments. 111 President
Johnson signed the Act on April 11, 1968.112 The Act differed from state
riot laws in that it did not criminalize rioting itself but rather criminalized
interstate travel or the use of interstate commerce, with intent to do one of
four things: (1) incite a riot; (2) organize, promote, encourage, participate in,
or carry out a riot; (3) commit any act of violence in furtherance of a riot; or
(4) aid or abet any person in inciting, participating in, or carrying out a riot,
or committing any act of violence in furtherance of a riot.113
Numerous senators objected to the rushed process, arguing that they were
asked to vote for a bill with little consideration of its implications,
particularly with such a complicated matter.114 However, Senator Thurmond
argued that the government “must be empowered to deal firmly and actively
with these harbingers of anarchy who undoubtedly contributed substantially
to the tragedies of our cities.”115 As such, Congress broadly defined “riot”116
and “incite a riot”117 in the Act as a means to target “outside agitators” who
were alleged to have traveled between various cities with the intent of stirring
up discontent and leaving a crowd prepared for a future riot.118 Of note,
Attorney General Ramsey Clark submitted recommended definitions to the
108. See id.; see also Reply Brief of the Appellants at 5, United States v. Miselis, 972 F.3d
518 (No. 19-4550) (4th Cir. 2020).
109. 114 CONG. REC. 5523–24 (1968) (statement of Sen. Thurmond); see also Ryan J.
Reilly, How Segregationists Rushed Through the 1968 Rioting Laws DOJ Is Using in 2020,
HUFFPOST (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/anti-rioting-act-civil-disorderlaw-doj-barr-trump-consitutional_n_5f6a012cc5b655acbc701ca2 [https://perma.cc/R2QWC7T2].
110. See 114 CONG. REC. 5033 (1968) (statement of Sen. Lausche).
111. See id. at 6001–02 (statement of Sen. Spong); Zalman, supra note 70, at 912.
112. See Reply Brief of the Appellants, supra note 108, at 8.
113. 18 U.S.C. § 2101(a); see Kaminski, supra note 69, at 27.
114. 114 CONG. REC. 5213–14 (1968) (statement of Sen. Harris); see also Reply Brief of
the Appellants, supra note 108, at 8 (noting that several senators objected to voting for the bill
due to the hasty process).
115. See Reilly, supra note 109.
116. 18 U.S.C. § 2102(a) (defining a “riot” as a public disturbance involving an assemblage
of three or more persons in which: an act or acts of violence by one or more of those persons
constitute a clear and present danger of or result in damage or injury to the property or person
of another; or a threat of violence in which the assemblage individually or collectively has the
ability to immediately execute the threat with actual violence either results in damage or poses
a clear and present danger of damage or injury).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 2102(b) (defining “incite a riot” as including “urging or instigating other
persons to riot,” but not oral or written advocacy of ideas or, as the expression of belief,
advocacy of any act or acts of violence or assertion of the rightness of, or the right to commit,
any such act or acts).
118. See Zalman, supra note 70, at 916 (quoting remarks from Representative Albert
W. Watson that “[t]here is no longer any doubt that the leaders of the mobs who are attacking
our policemen and innocent victims are allied with the Communists”).
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Senate floor on behalf of the Johnson administration to provide more precise
language and remove any constitutional concerns of overbreadth; however,
the submissions were rejected due to the urgency from some senators to pass
this Act.119 As mentioned, congressmembers had conflicting views on the
necessity to enact the Act,120 and Senator John Sherman Cooper of Kentucky
even stated, “I do not believe that the passage of a riot act will deal with the
causes of riots. . . [and] there are deeper causes [to the riots], as spelled out
by the [Kerner] Commission.”121 In response, Senator Russell B. Long of
Louisiana declared that his constituents and the American people were
waiting on senators to hold civil rights leaders like H. Rap Brown and Stokely
Carmichael accountable for starting riots.122 Surprisingly, Congressman
Emanuel Celler of New York was on record having an intense exchange with
Congressman Joe Waggonner of Louisiana stating that his vote in support of
the Act, despite his serious opposition to its entirety, was merely to ensure
his “good provisions” in the Fair Housing Act123 would successfully make it
through.124
In sum, the congressional record illustrates that the literal violence from
rioting was to be prosecuted by the states, as “keeping of the public peace in
our cities has always been traditionally a matter of local control.”125 The Act
was not drafted to focus on literal acts of violence, but rather to provide the
federal government with a means to prosecute the individuals who initiated
the events that precede the riots.126
Nevertheless, the constitutionality of a federal or state statute requires
prompt notice and review by the federal government.127 With this in mind,
Part II considers the views from the three branches of government regarding
citizens’ right to peacefully assemble and petition.
II. DOES THE ANTI-RIOT ACT ACCOMPLISH CONGRESS’S ENVISIONED
SAFEGUARDS AGAINST VIOLENT CIVIL DISTURBANCES?
The historical effort to evenly apply the Act to every U.S. citizen,
including protected classes, has received varied criticism from the three
branches of government. The benefits of the Act are tangible since a strategic
response from law enforcement authorities exists to prevent the fear of public
unrest in American streets. However, a notable detriment of anti-riot
provisions is the impact they have on racially diverse protestors,128
119. See generally 114 CONG. REC. 5213 (1968) (statement of Att’y Gen. Clark); United
States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 411 (7th Cir. 1972) (Pell, J., concurring in part).
120. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
121. 114 CONG. REC. 5212 (1968) (statement of Sen. Cooper).
122. Id. at 5227–28 (statement of Sen. Long).
123. Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (1968) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
the U.S.C.).
124. 114 CONG. REC. 6490 (1968) (statement of Rep. Celler).
125. 112 CONG. REC. 18,464 (1966) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
126. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
127. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.1.
128. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
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specifically when the issues are related to equality and police brutality.129
The question of whether the Act is being enforced as Congress intended—as
a safeguard for the public against violent civil disturbances—arises as a
result. Part II.A outlines the federal government’s recent assessment of the
Act. Part II.B then considers whether the Act’s effects are consistent with
Congress’s intent.
A. Contemporary Assessment of the Anti-Riot Act
The government has a high burden when it intends to single out speakers
based on their opinions. As such, one of the most common issues in the
“freedom of expression”130 jurisprudence arises when the government is
authorized to permissibly restrict certain expressions in society.131 While the
Act is a significant means to regulate protests and demonstrations,132 courts
have inquired into its constitutional validity, the construction of its
provisions, and its application.133 Of note, neither the government nor the
courts have explicitly addressed the level of scrutiny the courts should apply
to the Act, and this omission has resulted in analyses of the provisions under
varying standards.134 Part II.A.1 reviews how federal courts have interpreted
the Act’s anti-riot provisions. Part II.A.2 evaluates the U.S. Department of
Justice’s interpretation of the Act.
1. The Federal Judiciary’s Interpretation
Federal courts have found the Act facially constitutional on numerous
instances.135 However, courts have struggled over how to interpret many
provisions of the Act,136 including the overt act elements, and whether they
should be severed for “fail[ing] to bear an adequate relation between speech
and violence.”137 Additionally, courts have assessed whether the specific

129. See generally Thomas J. Sugrue, 2020 Is Not 1968: To Understand Today’s Protests,
You Must Look Further Back, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (June 11, 2020),
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/history/article/2020-not-1968 [https://perma.cc/8HLM4SE6].
130. See supra notes 52–58 and accompanying text.
131. See supra notes 59–66 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text.
133. See infra Part II.A.1.
134. See United States v. Daley, 378 F. Supp. 3d 539, 553 (W.D. Va. 2019).
135. See, e.g., United States v. Dellinger, 472 F.2d 340, 354–64 (7th Cir. 1972) (holding
that the legislative history does not expound on an intent outside the Act’s reasonable
construction); United States v. Hoffman, 334 F. Supp. 504, 509 (D.D.C. 1971) (upholding the
Act as a valid exercise of Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause); In re Shead, 302
F. Supp. 560, 564–67 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (finding that no significant legislative material is found
to refute a reasonable interpretation of the Act).
136. Compare Daley, 378 F. Supp. at 555–58 (rejecting the defendants’ claims regarding
vagueness and overbreadth and their Brandenburg challenge), with United States v. Rundo,
497 F. Supp. 3d 872, 880 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (holding that the Anti-Riot Act is unconstitutionally
overbroad in violation of the First Amendment).
137. Compare United States v. Miselis, 972 F.3d 518, 534 (4th Cir. 2020) (disagreeing with
both parties’ interpretation of the overt act element and analogizing the provision to an attempt
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intent elements of “organizing,” “promoting,” “encouraging,” and “urging”
are overbroad and whether they should be severed for not “bear[ing] the
requisite relation between speech and lawlessness.”138 Moreover, courts
have reflected on whether a particular phrase that states mere advocacy of
any act or acts of violence is severable from the remainder of the statute.139
Following the Act’s passage in 1968, the Court established the
Brandenburg incitement test,140 which was designed to determine whether a
statute’s distinction between permissible and impermissible actions would
violate one’s constitutional guarantees as related to freedom of expression.141
Applying this test, several circuits have recently found the Act itself to be
constitutional, though they differ over questions of severability.142
One of the first cases to consider the Act’s constitutionality was United
States v. Dellinger,143 which arose from protests during the 1968 Democratic
National Convention in response to the United States’s involvement in the
Vietnam War.144 Defendants David Dellinger, Rennie Davis, and Tom
Hayden were members of an organization called the National Mobilization
Committee to End the War in Vietnam, and Abbie Hoffman and Jerry Rubin
were members of the Youth International Party (“Yippie” or the
“Yippies”).145 Their chief purpose was to travel across the nation organizing
various protests against military involvement in the Vietnam War and
“racism, poverty, and injustice in the United States.”146 As a result of their
involvement with organizing the demonstration in Chicago, all five were
prosecuted for traveling in interstate commerce with the intent to “incit[e],
organiz[e], promot[e], and encourag[e] a riot.”147
The defendants were convicted in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois for violating the Act.148 In its decision to reverse and
offense), with United States v. Rundo, 990 F.3d 709, 715–16 (9th Cir. 2021) (noting that the
overt act provisions can be reasonably interpreted in a more limited scope).
138. See Miselis, 972 F.3d at 535–38 (tracing the definitions and examples of each
speech-related verb to determine whether the Act violates any protected language); Rundo,
990 F.3d at 717–20 (examining the protected speech prohibited by the Act and determining
whether the Act “may be salvaged by severance”).
139. See Miselis, 972 F.3d at 546–47 (noting that the Act is severable to a partial extent to
ensure that the remainder of the Act is left intact); Rundo, 990 F.3d at 720 (holding that the
Act is salvageable by severance).
140. 395 U.S. at 447 (noting that mere advocacy of the rightness of violence was protected
speech).
141. See id. at 447–48.
142. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
143. 472 F.2d 340 (7th Cir. 1972).
144. Id. at 349.
145. Id. at 348.
146. Id. at 349; see also Laurie L. Levenson, Judicial Ethics: Lessons from the Chicago
Eight Trial, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 879, 883–84 (2019).
147. Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 348.
148. See id. at 348–50. See generally Susan R. Klein, Movements in the Discretionary
Authority of Federal District Court Judges over the Last 50 Years, 50 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 933,
936–37 (2019) (noting that this infamous trial is commonly known as the “Chicago Seven”
trial, during which the media focused almost exclusively on the theatrical and contentious
outbursts between the defendants and Judge Julius Hoffman).
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remand the case,149 the Seventh Circuit reviewed the constitutionality of the
Act.150 This is significant because, at the time of trial, the Act had received
only limited judicial treatment151 and presented issues of potentially
abridging expression that had never been previously addressed.152
The Seventh Circuit upheld the Act after applying the Brandenburg
incitement test and acknowledged that the “legislative history [gave] no help
in identifying the intent.”153 It also found that, despite the “awkward
phraseology” and “unnecessary language” employed in the Act, the Act in
its entirety did not chill free speech and did not raise overbreadth doctrine
concerns.154 Moreover, the court held that Congress had a legitimate goal in
drafting the Act for national security reasons and that the means by which
Congress adopted the Act were constitutional.155 However, in partial dissent,
Judge Wilbur F. Pell, Jr. concluded that the Act was facially unconstitutional
and “clearly violative of the First Amendment right of freedom of speech.”156
Judge Pell also argued that the statute was not sufficiently narrow or precise
enough to avoid constitutional conflicts.157 Moreover, Judge Pell argued that
Congress’s intent to punish such agitators would not happen in the Act’s
current form without “running afoul of First Amendment rights.”158
Following Dellinger, few cases have arisen from the Act, leaving the
courts with limited opportunities to examine its constitutionality.159
However, several protests in recent years have spurred prosecutions under
the Act, requiring courts to again review the Act’s constitutionality.

149. Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 409. A detailed examination of the grounds for reversal is
beyond the scope of this Note.
150. See id. at 354–64.
151. See In re Shead, 302 F. Supp. 560, 566–67 (N.D. Cal. 1969) (finding the provisions
of the Act to be sufficiently restrictive to sustain its validity unless an indictment fails to refine
the distinction between mere advocacy and incitement); Carter v. United States, 417 F.2d 384
(9th Cir. 1969) (noting that the appellant had no standing to contest the constitutionality of the
Act since the underlying issue of immunity is covered by another statute).
152. See Dellinger, 472 F.2d at 354–55.
153. Id. at 363.
154. Id. at 355–64 (concluding that when a statute is so broadly drafted and “no readily
apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statute[],” it must be
declared a violation of an individual’s First Amendment rights).
155. See id. at 362.
156. Id. at 409 (Pell, J., concurring in part) (reviewing the legislative history and describing
how Congress gave serious attention to the need to enact anti-riot bills as a response to the
violence that took place in the mid-1960s).
157. See id. at 410.
158. Id. at 410.
159. See United States v. Markiewicz, 978 F.2d 786, 813 (2d Cir. 1992) (acknowledging
that “[t]he use of a facility of interstate commerce is an essential element of an anti-riot act
offense”); Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Lynn, 492 F.2d 979, 985 (1st Cir. 1974) (finding
that the definition of riot explicitly covers a public disturbance involving acts of violence and
excludes a covert act); United States v. Betts, 509 F. Supp. 3d 1053, 1059–60 (C.D. Ill. 2020)
(holding that the Act is not unconstitutionally overbroad in violation of an individual’s First
Amendment rights); In re Application of Madison, 687 F. Supp. 2d 103, 112 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
(finding that the Act provides adequate notice to prohibited conduct, and acknowledging that
it is a “broad criminal statute”).
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Recently, the Fourth160 and Ninth161 Circuits were presented with similar
disputes addressing the constitutionality of the Act. Each of these cases is
discussed in turn.
In United States v. Miselis,162 defendants Benjamin Daley and Michael
Miselis were members of the Rise Above Movement (RAM), a local white
supremacist, “combat-ready” militant movement that had the chief purpose
of attending political rallies organized by other groups and engaging in
violent attacks on counterprotesters.163 On appeal, the defendants challenged
their convictions164 on the grounds that the Act is facially overbroad under
the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and void for vagueness under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.165 The lower court ruled
that the Act “does not criminalize peaceful protest or lawful assembly but
rather targets ‘public disturbance[s] involving’ violence or the threat of such
violence undergirded by the ‘ability of immediate execution.’”166 The lower
court rejected the defendants’ facial challenge under the Brandenburg
incitement test,167 holding that the conduct condemned by the Act is
“sufficiently limit[ed]” to criminalize the acts that the defendants’ may have
advocated in connection to an “actual or imminent riot.” 168
A panel of the Fourth Circuit unanimously affirmed the lower court’s
ruling169 and held that the Act was not unconstitutionally vague.170 The court
acknowledged that the Act did “sweep[] up a substantial amount of speech
that remains protected,” violating the First Amendment.171 However, the
court determined that the Act, as a whole, was consistent with the First
Amendment and that the appropriate remedy to invalidating the discrete
instances of overbreadth was to sever172 the discrete areas of overbreadth173
to keep the remainder of the Act intact.174

160. United States v. Miselis, 972 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2020).
161. United States v. Rundo, 990 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2021).
162. 972 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2020).
163. Id. at 526; see Rise Above Movement (R.A.M), ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE,
https://www.adl.org/resources/backgrounders/rise-above-movement-ram
[https://perma.cc/3K3X-BE4T] (last visited Mar. 4, 2022).
164. The defendants were charged with traveling in interstate commerce while violently
participating in white supremacist rallies that occurred in California as well as the notorious
“Unite the Right” rally in Charlottesville, Virginia. See Miselis, 972 F.3d at 525.
165. Id.
166. United States v. Daley, 378 F. Supp. 3d 539, 554–55 (W.D. Va. 2019) (alteration in
original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2102(a)).
167. See id. at 556–57.
168. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448 (1969)).
169. See Miselis, 972 F.3d at 525.
170. See id. at 525–26.
171. Id. at 525.
172. See id. at 530 (connotating that “the remainder of the statute is constitutionally valid,
capable of operating independently, and consistent with Congress’s basic objectives”).
173. See id. at 525–26 (noting that “speech intending to ‘encourage’ or ‘promote’ a riot, as
well as speech ‘urging’ others to riot or ‘involving’ mere advocacy of violence” were
protected).
174. See id.
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After agreeing that the Act was facially overbroad in part, the court
outlined the overbreadth analysis to determine what the statute covers and
whether the Act reached too far.175 Applying this analysis, courts must first
“construe the challenged statute” and ask whether “limiting construction” is
viable.176 Second, courts must examine whether the statute “criminalizes a
substantial amount of protected expressive activity.”177 Finally, if the
unconstitutional portions are severable, then they must be invalidated.178
The court evaluated the Act’s congressional intent by assessing the plain
meaning of each of the “string of speech-related verbs”179 under the Act.180
Taking up each provision, the court determined that the plain meaning of
“incite” most sensibly referred to speech that would likely produce
lawlessness.181 The court then turned to “promote” and “encourage,”
holding that these provisions were overbroad because these terms included
too much conduct unlikely to produce an imminent riot.182 Moreover, the
court determined that speech “urging” others to riot or involving “mere
advocacy of violence” were similarly inadequate.183 However, the court held
that the term “organize” was not overbroad because it is readily understood
to mean the formation or establishment of something—it is not simply an
abstract idea, but rather is “concrete aid” to an event that has “begun to take
shape.”184
In the second step of its overbreadth analysis, the court found that the Act
included a “substantial amount of protected advocacy” relative to its “plainly
legitimate sweep.”185 The regulation of “speech tending . . . to ‘encourage,’
‘promote,’ or ‘urge’ others to riot, as well as mere advocacy of any act of
violence” was meant to be protected by Brandenburg.186 Therefore, the court
determined that the Act is inconsistent with the First Amendment and
“encroach[es] substantially upon free speech.”187
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit also found that the substantially overbroad
provisions of the Act were severable.188 In its examination, the court applied

175. See id. at 531.
176. Id.
177. Id. (quoting United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 297 (2008)).
178. Id.
179. Id. at 535 (referencing to “incite,” “organize,” “promote,” and “encourage”).
180. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2101–2102.
181. Miselis, 972 F.3d at 536.
182. Id. at 536–37 (“[W]e don’t think either verb is ‘readily susceptible’ of such an artificial
limitation.” (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 481 (2010))).
183. Id. at 538 (“[The] verb [‘urging’] suffers from a similarly inadequate relation between
speech and lawless action . . . .”).
184. Id. at 537 (“[S]peech tending to organize a riot serves . . . to facilitate the occurrence
of a riot that has already begun to take shape.”).
185. Id. at 541.
186. Id.
187. Id. (“[T]he Anti-Riot Act . . . sweeps up a substantial amount of protected
advocacy.”).
188. Id.
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the traditional rule for severability189 by retaining the constitutionally valid
portions of the Act that are “capable of functioning independently” and
consistent with Congress’s original intent when enacting the statute.190
Applying this rule, the court held that the language responsible for
overbreadth should be severed but that the remainder of the Act was
“perfectly valid.”191 The court reasoned that while Congress intended to
“encompass the full scope of . . . unprotected speech” relating to the wave of
riots, Congress would likely prefer the trimmed version of the Act instead of
no statute at all.192
Like the Fourth Circuit in Miselis, the Ninth Circuit in United States v.
Rundo193 also applied the Brandenburg incitement test to determine whether
the Act’s anti-riot provisions were facially overbroad and criminalized a
substantial amount of protected speech.194 In Rundo, defendants Robert Paul
Rundo, Robert Boman, Tyler Laube, and Aaron Eason were members of
RAM charged with conspiracy to violate the Act after posting recruitment
videos and pictures online showing their combat training and assaults on
protestors at various political rallies across California.195 The lower court
dismissed their indictment on the ground that the Act was unconstitutional.196
The government appealed to the Ninth Circuit arguing that the district
court erred in not applying a narrow construction of the Act which would
have thereby severed the offending portions of the Act.197 Reviewing de
novo, the Ninth Circuit agreed that the district court erred in not applying the
severability clause.198 Utilizing a similar analysis as applied in Miselis, the
court found that the Act was salvageable199 and that Congress would have
preferred severance over complete invalidation.200 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
held that the Act was not “unconstitutional on its face” and that a balance
must be struck between the government’s ability to protect the nation from
people “who are trying to perpetrate, or cause the perpetration of . . . violent
outrages” and the importance in maintaining a citizens’ freedom of
expression.201
189. Id. at 542 (“[U]nconstitutional provision[s] must be severed unless the statute created
in its absence is legislation that Congress would not have enacted.” (quoting Seila Law LLC
v. Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, 140 S. Ct. 2183, 2209 (2020))).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 543.
192. Id. (“[I]f Congress could have foreseen the Court’s decision in Brandenburg, it would
have readily preferred to enact this appropriately narrowed version of the statute.”).
193. 990 F.3d 709 (9th Cir. 2021).
194. See id. at 716–17.
195. See id. at 713.
196. See id. at 712–13; see also United States v. Rundo, 497 F. Supp. 3d 872, 879–80 (C.D.
Cal. 2019).
197. See Government’s Opening Brief, United States v. Rundo, 990 F.3d 709
(9th Cir. 2021) (No. 19-50189).
198. See Rundo, 990 F.3d at 714.
199. Id. at 716–20 (“[S]everance is the remedy that must be applied when it is possible to
do so.” (quoting United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 258–59 (2005))).
200. See id. at 720; Miselis, 972 F.3d at 543–44.
201. Rundo, 990 F.3d at 721.
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As the cases above underscore, the severability clause has been accepted
by the Supreme Court as a justiciable remedy “whenever an act of Congress
contains unobjectionable provisions separable from those found to be
unconstitutional,” and courts, therefore, have a duty to maintain an act’s
validity.202 Applying this principle, both the Fourth and Ninth Circuits
recommended that the language responsible for the Act’s overbreadth be
removed, rendering the Act “perfectly valid” and consistent with Congress’s
basic intent when drafting it.203
2. The Department of Justice’s Interpretation
While state and local officials have primary responsibility for preventing
any acts of violence, the Department of Justice (DOJ) may intervene when it
believes that an unending threat of riots falls within its jurisdiction.204
Specifically, one of the Act’s central provisions serves to prevent organizers
who travel or use any interstate facility205 from inciting or “commit[ting] any
act of violence in furtherance of a riot.”206
However, following the decision in Miselis, the DOJ Acting Solicitor
General Elizabeth Prelogar prepared a memorandum for Speaker of the
House Nancy Pelosi outlining the DOJ’s disagreement with the Fourth
Circuit’s conclusion that portions of the Act violated the First
Amendment.207 Notably, the court had actually affirmed the defendants’
convictions, so the rationale for severing the provisions was effectively
inconsequential to the DOJ’s case.208 Nevertheless, the DOJ summarized
that it remains committed to prosecuting individuals under the Act.209
Further, the DOJ acknowledged that the affirmance of convictions under the
Act validated its constitutionality if narrowly applied.210 Therefore, the DOJ
decided not to file a petition for a writ of certiorari following Miselis,
believing that their analytical approach to applying the Act would continue

202. See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 652 (1984) (quoting El Paso & Ne. Ry. Co. v.
Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87, 96 (1909)); Miselis, 972 F.3d at 541.
203. See Miselis, 972 F.3d at 543; Rundo, 990 F.3d at 721.
204. See Press Release, William P. Barr, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Att’y Gen.
William P. Barr’s Statement on Riots and Domestic Terrorism (May 31, 2020),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-william-p-barrs-statement-riots-anddomestic-terrorism [https://perma.cc/4WX3-U4UD]; see also Josh Gerstein & Evan Semones,
Barr Threatens to Bust ‘Far-Left Extremist Groups’ in Floyd Unrest, POLITICO (May 30, 2021,
4:04 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/05/30/william-barr-george-floyd-protests290792 [https://perma.cc/A5G3-NE85].
205. 18 U.S.C. § 2101(b) (“[I]ncluding but not limited to, mail, telegraph, telephone, radio,
or television, to communicate with or broadcast to any person or group of persons prior to
such overt acts . . . .”).
206. 18 U.S.C. § 2101(a).
207. Memorandum from Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Acting Solic. Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just. to
Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, House of Reps. (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.justice.gov/oip/foialibrary/osg-530d-letters/us_v_miselis_530d/download [https://perma.cc/46JF-MF3Q].
208. See id. at 1.
209. See id. at 3.
210. See id.
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to achieve the mission of investigating and prosecuting individuals and
groups who engage in “violent confrontations” during protests.211
In response to the protests that spanned the United States following the
deaths of Ms. Taylor and Mr. Floyd, Attorney General William Barr
immediately asserted that “[w]e must have law and order on our streets and
in our communities” and singularly condemned these actions as being carried
out by “far-left extremist groups.”212 Attorney General Barr further claimed
that the “radical left” was solely responsible for the violence and criticized
local district attorneys for their “lax” approach to enforcing the law, arguing
that such actions put the country in danger.213 Despite Attorney General
Barr’s unsubstantiated claims,214 the DOJ began prosecuting individuals
under the Act based on these assertions.215
B. The Effects of Lawful Enforcement of the Anti-Riot Act
As previously noted, the congressional record revealed that the violence
from rioting was to be prosecuted by the states; notably, the “keeping of the
public peace in our cities has always been traditionally a matter of local
control.”216 As such, states have proposed and passed a high volume of
anti-riot legislation following the death of Mr. Floyd.217 However, the
anti-riot legislation is divided along partisan lines as the parties have differing
211. Id.
212. See Gerstein & Semones, supra note 204.
213. See id.
214. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., HOMELAND THREAT ASSESSMENT 4, 17–18
(2020), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/2020_10_06_homeland-threatassessment.pdf [https://perma.cc/D9RT-B7J3] (finding that the most concerning domestic
threat to homeland security is from “white supremacist violent extremists who have been
exceptionally lethal in their abhorrent, targeted attacks”); Alanna Durkin Richer et al., AP
Finds Most Arrested in Protests Aren’t Leftist Radicals, AP NEWS (Oct. 20, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/virus-outbreak-race-and-ethnicity-suburbs-health-racial-injustice7edf9027af1878283f3818d96c54f748 [https://perma.cc/DW29-3KWF]; Eric Tucker and Ben
Fox, FBI Director Says Antifa Is an Ideology, Not an Organization, AP NEWS (Sept. 17, 2020),
https://apnews.com/article/donald-trump-ap-top-news-elections-james-comey-politicsbdd3b6078e9efadcfcd0be4b65f2362e [https://perma.cc/WK3B-VVHG].
215. See Betts, 509 F. Supp. 3d at 1056; see also United States v. Rupert, No. 20-CR-104,
2021 WL 942101, slip op. at *1 (D. Minn. Mar. 12, 2021).
216. See 112 CONG. REC. 18,464 (1966) (statement of Rep. Edwards).
217. See, e.g., H.B. 1508, 93d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ark. 2021) (creating a new
mandatory minimum sentence of thirty days in jail for “the offense of riot” and defining rioting
to include engaging with two or more persons in “tumultuous” conduct that creates a
“substantial risk” of “public alarm”); H.B. 289, 2021 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2021)
(expanding the definition of “unlawful assembly” to include “two or more persons who harass
or intimidate another person within any public accommodation”); H.B. 1205, 122d Gen.
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2021) (increasing the penalty for “riot” from a Class A
misdemeanor to a Level 6 felony, punishable by up to 2.5 years in prison and a $10,000 fine
if committed by a person wearing a mask or other face covering); H.B. 2464, 58th Gen.
Assemb., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2021) (creating a new mandatory minimum sentence of not less than
two years in jail for any act in connection with a riot); H.B. 3491, 124th Gen. Assemb., Reg.
Sess. (S.C. 2021) (criminalizing the blocking of a street, sidewalk, or “any other place used
for the passage of persons, vehicles or conveyances” without legal privilege, and any person
found guilty could face up to three years in jail).
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views on promoting public safety.218 For example, Republican lawmakers
argue that harsher penalties are needed to protect public spaces, irrespective
of whether these penalties chill access to peaceful protests.219 In contrast,
Democratic lawmakers assert that a novel approach predicated on
safeguarding First Amendment rights is needed.220
This political divide is echoed in discussions concerning the intent behind
the Act. Thus, Part II.B.1 considers the conflicting views regarding the Act’s
original intent. Part II.B.2 then examines whether contemporary federal
solutions and state anti-riot provisions comport or conflict with the Act’s
stated purpose.
1. The Political Divide over the Act’s Intent
While Republican legislators who support anti-riot provisions
acknowledge the public anger over the murder of Black Americans by law
enforcement, some also believe that protecting the nation, its citizens, and
real property from destruction is essential to a secure community. 221 Indeed,
legislative history indicates that current members of Congress want to
“prevent violence and protect law enforcement officers.” 222 Accordingly, it
is necessary to assess whether this intent is being carried out without usurping
individuals’ constitutional rights.223
Republicans argue that increasing the penalties associated with anti-riot
provisions will further the Act’s intentions by promoting security.224 The
enforcement of these strict penalties overtly persuades citizens to limit their
protest activity due to the fear of over-policing.225 Under this view, the
proposed anti-riot provisions deter an individual from behaving with a mob
mentality and engaging in violent assemblies that would destroy business
establishments and other property.226
218. Compare Press Release, Ken Buck, Rep., U.S. House of Reps., Congressman Ken
Buck Reintroduces the BRICKS Act (Jan. 25, 2021), https://buck.house.gov/mediacenter/press-releases/congressman-ken-buck-reintroduces-bricks-act
[https://perma.cc/
3REU-SQ8B] (statement by Republican member of Congress), with Press Release, Karen
Bass, Rep., House of Reps., Reps. Bass Issues Statement Regarding Police Reform
Negotiations (Sept. 22, 2021), https://bass.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/reps-bassissues-statement-regarding-police-reform-negotiations
[https://perma.cc/CR5Z-R6HH]
(statement by Democratic member of Congress).
219. See infra notes 241–50 and accompanying text.
220. See generally Press Release, Karen Bass, supra note 218.
221. See, e.g., Press Release, Ken Buck, supra note 218; Sophie Quinton, Eight States
Enact Anti-Protest Laws, PEW (June 21, 2021), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2021/06/21/eight-states-enact-anti-protest-laws
[https://perma.cc/N2YW-HDMQ] (quoting remarks from Governor Ron DeSantis: “We
want[] to make sure that we were able to protect the people of our great state, people’s
businesses and property against any type of mob activity or violent assemblies”).
222. See Press Release, Ken Buck, supra note 218; Quinton, supra note 221.
223. See Adams, supra note 106.
224. See Reid J. Epstein & Patricia Mazzei, G.O.P. Bills Target Protesters (and Absolve
Motorists Who Hit Them), N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/
21/us/politics/republican-anti-protest-laws.html [https://perma.cc/X3VF-RKVS].
225. See Adams, supra note 106.
226. See Quinton, supra note 221.
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In contrast, Democrats contest the use of anti-riot provisions, arguing that
it dissuades individuals from exercising their constitutional rights.227
Accordingly, this harm incurred by the proposed anti-riot provisions affects
the interests of peaceful protestors who Democrats believe would otherwise
feel welcome to march on matters that address social issues.228 For example,
an individual who participates in a peaceful protest that subsequently
becomes violent through the acts of individuals unassociated with the
demonstration would still be liable under the Act for being part of the
crowd.229 These issues are exacerbated by anti-riot provisions because their
broad interpretations could create liability by association and allow law
enforcement authorities the ability to incarcerate protestors for actions they
deem undesirable.230
As a result, the ability to protest is subdued because the Act causes
organizers and peaceful protestors to fear they may be prosecuted when other
actors incite and commit violence.231 This burden impacts all individuals
and, by dissuading Americans from peacefully protesting, undermines the
congressional intent behind the Act to “protect society from the extremist
element which advocates the destruction of our nation.”232
2. The Convergence of Congressional Solutions and State Legislative
Defenses
Beyond the Act’s intentions, the question of whether federal intervention
is necessary depends on whether state legislative efforts to create new classes
of offenses for prosecuting organizers of protests are sufficient to address the
concerns of anti-riot provisions’ drafters.
In response to an increase in anti-riot provisions proposed at the federal
and state level, representatives of civil rights groups, for example, have stated
that “turnout at protests drastically decrease[d] and [leaders] have . . .
cancel[ed] demonstrations to protect members from violence.”233

227. See Adams, supra note 106.
228. See id.
229. See id. (noting that the Act’s penalties on demonstrators are unclear since the
delineation between a peaceful protestor and violent actor is vague).
230. See id.
231. See id.
232. See Reilly, supra note 109 (emphasis added).
233. See Lalee Ibssa, What To Know About Florida’s Anti-Riot Law and the Corresponding
Legal Challenge, ABC NEWS (Aug. 7, 2021, 9:56 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/floridasanti-riot-law-legal-challenge/story?id=79224398 [https://perma.cc/UH6D-HMTH]; see also
Civil Rights Groups File Federal Lawsuit Challenging Florida’s Anti-Protest Law, ACLU
(May 11, 2021), https://www.aclufl.org/en/press-releases/civil-rights-groups-file-federallawsuit-challenging-floridas-anti-protest-law [https://perma.cc/85Y8-M9UM] (filing on
behalf of “The Black Collective, Black Lives Matter Alliance Broward, Chainless Change,
Dream Defenders, the Florida State Conference of the NAACP, and the Northside Coalition
of Jacksonville”).
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Meanwhile, Congress has remained silent in the face of courts striking text
from the Act as unconstitutional,234 since those holdings did not undermine
the validity of any other enforceable provision in the Act.235
Instead, in response to the escalation of protests that occurred across the
nation, Congress took two entirely different approaches236—generally along
partisan lines—to study and address this problem.237 One response led by
Republican congressmembers was a proposed action to amend the Act by
increasing the maximum term of imprisonment for the offense of rioting and
other unlawful action238 despite the chilling impact on peaceful protests. At
the same time, a different approach, which garnered bipartisan support, was
the George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020239 (“Policing Act”) and the
establishment of a Commission on the Social Status of Black Men and Boys
Act240 (“Commission on Black Men”).
Senator Tom Cotton of Arkansas and Congressman Ken Buck of Colorado
proposed the Blocking Rioters and Insurrectionists from our Cities to Keep
us Safe Act of 2021241 (“BRICKS Act”) in the Senate and the House of
Representatives, respectively. Of note, the original proposal was introduced
in 2020 but died on the House floor.242 As a result, Representative Buck
reintroduced the BRICKS Act in 2021, intending to increase terms of
imprisonment for protestors to alleviate the potential fear citizens had from
the wave of protests that swept across the country.243 The BRICKS Act
proposed increasing the statutory maximum prison terms for a rioting offense
from five years to ten years.244 It also established higher statutory maximum
penalties for rioting offenses that involve certain aggravating
characteristics.245 Specifically, the bill proposed a prison term of up to
twenty-five years for a rioting offense resulting in serious bodily injury or
including dangerous activity, and a prison term of any years or for life for a
rioting offense resulting in death or including a capital offense.246 In defense
of the bill, Representative Buck stated that “[i]n order to truly restore unity
in this country, Congress must support efforts like this to stop the violence
perpetrated by the far left. . . . and [to] hold these criminals accountable for

234. See supra Part II.A.1.
235. See supra Part II.A.1.
236. Both political parties have remained relatively silent on the arguments posed by the
courts and the views summarized by the DOJ. See infra Part II.A.2.
237. See Sarah Ferris & Heather Caygle, Congress Turns to Age-Old Fix After Police
Reform Stalls: A Commission, POLITICO (July 28, 2020, 5:54 PM), https://www.politico.com/
news/2020/07/28/congress-police-reform-commission-384921
[https://perma.cc/KGJ42T6D].
238. See BRICKS Act of 2021, S. 33, 117th Cong. (2021).
239. H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. (2020).
240. Pub. L. No. 116-156, 134 Stat. 700 (2020) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1975 note).
241. S. 33, 117th Cong. (2021).
242. See BRICKS Act of 2020, H.R. 8757, 116th Cong. (2020).
243. See Press Release, Ken Buck, supra note 218.
244. See BRICKS Act of 2021, S. 33, 117th Cong. (2021).
245. See id.
246. See id.
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their large-scale destruction once and for all.”247 Moreover, Representative
Buck reiterated the same contention Senator Thurmond expressed when
introducing the Anti-Riot Act: that organized “leftist” groups are traveling
across the country from the “west coast to the east coast to the middle of the
country” to engage in criminal acts that the federal government has
jurisdiction over and needs to prosecute.248 In a similar tone, Senator Cotton
stated, “Those who use violence to advance their political agenda must be
met with the full force of the law.”249 Despite this bill being referred to the
U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, the committee has currently taken
no further action to advance it.250
In contrast, other members of Congress identified the protesting across
America as a response to decades of systemic racism and excessive policing
in communities of Black and Brown people.251 Congresswoman Karen Bass
of California proposed the Policing Act252 to increase accountability for law
enforcement misconduct and establish measures to prevent racial profiling
by law enforcement at the federal, state, and local levels.253 The Policing
Act was designed to enhance existing mechanisms to resolve law
enforcement violations, such as limiting qualified immunity and requiring
officers to complete training on implicit bias and the duty to intervene when
another officer uses excessive force.254 The bill passed in the House but
failed in the Senate.255
However, through bipartisan support, Senator Marco Rubio of Florida and
Congresswoman Frederica Wilson of Florida introduced the Commission on
Black Men.256 Within the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, the
Commission on Black Men takes an ideological view similar to that of the
Policing Act in addressing the issues of systemic protests.257 The
Commission on Black Men allows lawmakers the opportunity to address
broader issues of civil rights violations that affect Black men and boys.258
Specifically, the Commission on Black Men will conduct annual studies on
systematic conditions related to poverty, drug abuse, and health issues,

247. See Tyler Olson, Ken Buck’s Big Idea: Protect American Political System by
Toughening Federal Penalties Against Rioters, FOX NEWS (Nov. 20, 2020),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/ken-bucks-big-idea-the-brick-act-rioters-stiffer-penalties
[https://perma.cc/9ANT-SD85].
248. See id.
249. Press Release, Ken Buck, supra note 218.
250. See BRICKS Act of 2021, S. 33, 117th Cong. (2021).
251. See George Floyd Justice in Policing Act of 2020, H.R. 7120, 116th Cong. (2020).
252. Id.
253. See id.
254. See id.
255. 166 CONG. REC. S4263 (daily ed. July 20, 2020) (indicating that H.R. 7120 was placed
on the calendar).
256. See Pub. L. No. 116-156, 134 Stat. 700 (2020) (addressing the varying conditions
affecting Black males in the history of America’s cultural landscape).
257. See id.
258. See id.
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among other topics, to document trends within the Black community and
evaluate the impact of government programs in each area.259
Equally important, statewide criminal laws addressing anti-riot provisions
significantly vary across the nation.260 As previously stated, the Act was
designed to target organizers of protests who allegedly crossed state lines or
used a facility of interstate commerce with the intent to agitate local citizens
and violently destroy people’s businesses and property without being
prosecuted.261 By contrast, state anti-riot provisions were meant to target
crimes committed during a protest, regardless of their interstate nature.262
However, recent holdings from federal courts,263 as well as several proposed
state laws,264 have left open a debate as to whether additional federal
legislative action is desirable or even warranted.
Among the most disruptive of contemporary cases involving anti-riot
provisions is Dream Defenders v. DeSantis,265 a case arising from Florida’s
proposed anti-riot law (“HB-1”), spearheaded by Governor Ron DeSantis as
a way to quell violent protests following the wave of demonstrations in
response to the killing of George Floyd.266 Analogous to the Miselis court’s
interpretive approach when analyzing the Act,267 the Northern District of
Florida in Dream Defenders found HB-1 “vague” and “overbroad.”268 The
court held that HB-1 amounted to an assault on one’s freedom of expression
and violated the Constitution’s due process protections.269
In Dream Defenders, the court found that the definition of “riot” in HB-1
could have multiple reasonable interpretations and that its association with
the terms “participate” and “violent public disturbance” could lead to infinite
alternative readings such that an individual of ordinary intelligence would be
unable to discern its “real-world consequence.”270 The court further found
that the actions outlined as riotous conduct under HB-1—and its inclusion of
any associated participant—was a “trap for the innocent.”271 According to
the court, harmless protestors were thus required to make a choice between
expressing their views or facing the probability of being arrested.272
The court also noted that Governor DeSantis intended for HB-1 to
empower law enforcement officers against “[protestors] who may criticize
259. See id.
260. See supra note 217 and accompanying text; Quinton, supra note 221.
261. See supra Part I.C.
262. See supra note 216.
263. See supra Part II.A.1.
264. See supra note 217.
265. No. 21cv191, 2021 WL 4099437 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2021), appeal docketed,
No. 21-13489 (11th Cir. Mar. 17, 2022).
266. See Curt Anderson, Florida’s GOP-Backed ‘Anti-Riot’ Law Blocked by Judge,
AP NEWS (Sept. 9, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/courts-george-floyd-florida-race-andethnicity-laws-bd110e1229212aa5345a039db2223325 [https://perma.cc/AAD3-W59A].
267. See supra Part II.A.1.
268. Dream Defs., 2021 WL 4099437, at *29.
269. Id. at *13–14; see also Anderson, supra note 266.
270. See Dream Defs., 2021 WL 4099437, at *26–27.
271. Id.
272. Id. at *27.
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their legal authority” because he stated that “a ton of bricks [will] rain down
on [those who violate HB-1].”273 The court found that such threats do not
protect Floridians.274 The court further held that its judicial role was not to
narrow the construction of HB-1, but rather to hold HB-1 unconstitutional so
state legislators could amend HB-1.275
The court also noted that numerous criminal statutes276 relating to public
safety and private property already exist for law enforcement officers.277 The
court concluded that, in light of its breadth, the current application of HB-1
would negatively impact any political or social movement regardless of what
those speakers were advocating, thus violating individuals’ constitutional
rights.278 For these reasons, the court granted a preliminary injunction
against the enforcement of the new definition of “riot” contained in HB-1.279
Despite this latest judicial decision pertaining to the scope of a recent state
anti-riot provision, other states have continued to propose new anti-rioting
legislation.280
III. A PROPOSAL FOR A RENEWED FEDERAL EFFORT TO UPHOLD THE
RIGHT TO PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
In light of contentious legislative divides, judicial findings of
unconstitutionality, and the fundamental freedoms of speech and assembly
that are at stake, the time is ripe for executive intervention. It is evident that
a narrower, contemporary review would foster a balanced discussion
concerning peaceful protests with respect to an individual’s constitutional
rights given the legislative history,281 contemporary assessments,282 and
current application of the Act.283 This part focuses on determining what steps
the executive branch should take to address anti-riot provisions concerning
the Act’s intended defenses. As discussed above, Congress’s relative silence
on the unenforceable provisions in the Act is telling, especially when the
courts have explicitly emphasized that certain applications of those
provisions are found to be unconstitutional.284 Moreover, the effects of the
273. Id. at *28.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. The nonexhaustive list includes but is not limited to:
Disorderly Conduct, Affray, Criminal Mischief, Arson, Fire bombs, Assault,
Aggravated Assault, Battery and Felony Battery, Aggravated Battery, Assault of
Battery on Law Enforcement, Assault or Battery on Person 65 or Older, Trespassing,
Burglary, Mob Intimidation, Resisting Officer With Violence, Resisting Officer
Without Violence, Obstruction by Disguised Persons, Unlawful Assemblies, and
Destroying/Demolishing Memorial or Historic Property.
Id. at *32.
277. Id.
278. Id. at *32–33.
279. Id. at *33–34.
280. See supra note 217 and accompanying text.
281. See supra Part I.C.
282. See supra Part II.A.
283. See supra Part II.B.
284. See supra Part II.A.1.
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Act and state-level anti-riot provisions on protestors, as detailed in Part II.B,
demonstrate that the provisions’ obvious impact on individuals’
constitutional rights is paramount. Specifically, anti-riot provisions have a
“severe chilling impact on demonstrations”285 and force protestors to engage
in a risk calculation—namely, whether the risk of being shot by a
counterprotester286 or being arrested for peacefully protesting is a possibility
they are willing to accept.287 Not only do these provisions impact an
individual’s freedom to assemble and protest, but the effects of a vague and
overbroad statute could cause more hesitant individuals to refrain from
exercising their right to freedom of expression.288 This issue is especially
noticeable in the context of the latest federal government assessments289 and
conflicting congressional solutions designed to address such harms. 290
This part proposes that a narrowly focused presidential review is necessary
to determine the cause of escalating violence since the summer of 2020. It
also focuses on whether the impact of the Act and anti-riot provisions on
protestors is justified. Part III.A outlines the benefits of an executive branch
agenda to shape public policy on anti-riot provisions in the context of the
Act’s intended purpose. Part III.B demonstrates the value of a presidential
commission to study the current state of anti-riot provisions and how such
provisions could and should be eliminated.
A. The Development of an Executive Branch Agenda to Examine the Rise
of Protests
Congress is unquestionably the most appropriate venue when deciding
whether to amend or repeal federal laws because of its ability to gather a
breadth of data and input from its constituents. However when, in the
Supreme Court’s considered judgment, such legislation conflicts with the
Constitution, Congress’s failure to amend or repeal a law can serve as a
violation of their responsibilities.291 While this Note does not argue that
congressional inaction on this issue amounts to a violation of Congress’s
constitutional responsibility, a balance between managing public safety and
protecting citizens’ right to protest should be at the forefront of the legislative
agenda, especially when “global mass political protests continue to increase
in scale and frequency.”292
285. See Dream Defs., 2021 WL 4099437, at *7 (“[M]any [potential protestors] . . . have
decided not to protest out of fear of being arrested.”).
286. See, e.g., Becky Sullivan, Kyle Rittenhouse Is Acquitted of All Charges in the Trial
over Killing 2 in Kenosha, NPR (Nov. 19, 2021, 5:53 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/11/19/
1057288807/kyle-rittenhouse-acquitted-all-charges-verdict [https://perma.cc/L9T4-8DAZ].
287. See supra Part II.B.
288. See supra Part II.B.2.
289. See supra Part II.A.
290. See supra Part II.B.
291. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (declaring that “it is emphatically
the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is”).
292. See Riley McCabe, Global Political Protests and the Future of Democracy, CTR. FOR
STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD. (Mar. 5, 2021), https://www.csis.org/analysis/global-politicalprotests-and-future-democracy [https://perma.cc/B4Z2-87LW].
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This Note surmises that a widening partisan divide on how to
fundamentally address recent protests could significantly impact the views
of Americans, especially those who believe that the rights of all people are
not being respected.293 Indeed, it is imperative to outline why presidential
attention is the most practical and sound choice to effectuate necessary
change. The justification has three components.
First, a presidential commission would provide the president with a more
accurate assessment of current public views specifically related to protesting
and help effectuate new policy directives to set an agenda.294 Second, as
discussed in Part II.A, federal courts have generally held that certain
provisions of the Act are unconstitutional due to the overbreadth doctrine but
are divided as to an appropriate remedy to save the Act. The Supreme Court
has denied petitions for writs of certiorari.295 Third, the commission’s final
recommendations could subsequently lead the DOJ—which has the
authorization to promulgate rules and regulations—to codify new guidance
practices related to violent protesting.296
It is important to state that this Note is not directed at any one
administration. In fact, this part argues that sustained presidential
consideration is reasonably desired to guarantee significant progress on this
issue. The events that shaped President Johnson’s decision to establish the
Kerner Commission are in some respects similar to today’s demonstrations,
and presidential leadership for the development of a new executive branch
agenda to examine the rise of recent protests may be necessary for effective
reform.297 Furthermore, executive action would bring renewed vigor,
resources, and consideration to the examination of the rise in protests and
could counteract current congressional inaction.298
B. The Establishment of a Presidential Commission
The president should establish a commission via executive order to study
whether the Act and statewide anti-riot provisions have chilled access to
peaceful protests, with an emphasis on studying demonstrations stemming
from sociopolitical dissent. This commission would also consider how
violent protests could effectively be reduced. Scholars have recognized that
presidential commissions can serve a variety of functions, including
gathering and organizing information, providing an educational forum for the
public on a given issue, and generating novel policy recommendations.299
However, some have questioned the effectiveness of presidential
293. See supra Part II.B.
294. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 2 (requiring the president to recommend matters to
Congress for their consideration that he deems necessary and expedient).
295. See, e.g., Miselis, 972 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2756 (2021);
Daley, 972 F.3d 518 (4th Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 2756 (2021).
296. See supra Part II.A.2.
297. See supra Part I.A.
298. See supra Part I.B.
299. See SMITH, supra note 92, at 13; Graham, supra note 36, at 8; Zegart, supra note 99,
at 373–76.
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commissions,300 despite others noting the commissions’ abilities to spark
significant reform.301 For example, President Ronald Reagan created the
National Commission on Social Security Reform due to the failing Old-Age
and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund302 and eroding public confidence in the
Social Security system.303 Although history indicates President Reagan
appointed the commission to support one of his domestic policy goals, it was
a success, despite the “heated partisan politics surrounding the Social
Security issue,” because the recommendations were incorporated into the
Social Security Amendments of 1983.304 Moreover, the commission sent a
message to Congress accompanied with a compromise agreement calling for
necessary reforms, which led to further congressional study on the U.S.
Social Security Administration.305
In a similar vein, the president should develop a commission that would
gather information about the extent to which anti-riot provisions chill
participation in peaceful protests and should develop policy
recommendations for addressing this issue. Such a commission could serve
as a vehicle for educating the public about the harms of disrupting and
restricting lawful assembly and protest and for engaging the public in a
dialogue about the most effective avenues for reform. An advantage of
commissions is that they command public attention about an issue outside
the president’s administration, and the massive circulation of their focus
leads to an extended public dialogue.306 The commission could conduct a
public dialogue to inform the public of the social costs and benefits that may
be won through reforming anti-riot provisions. Furthermore, the president
could require the commission to develop recommendations for which DOJ
policies and procedures could better build trust in the communities and
ensure the safety of demonstrators who choose to peacefully protest.
Additionally, commissions can generate their own recommendations
absent presidential influence, exhibiting an independence of thought, and
thus maintain their political consensus and credibility among the public.307
To ensure the independence of the recommendations, a cross section of
experts with bipartisan support would likely be necessary, and the president
would need to avoid influencing the work of the commission and its resulting
300. See Barron, supra note 93, at 1122 (suggesting that commissions do not “play a
meaningful role in influencing regulatory policy” but “merely issue reports and the like”);
Zegart, supra note 99, at 389–90 (describing that most think of presidential commissions as
panels that “defuse, deflect, and delay presidential action . . . without producing much
substantive policy change”).
301. See supra Part I.B.
302. The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Trust Fund is a separate financial account in
the U.S. Department of the Treasury that automatically covers the payments of Social Security
benefits to retired-worker beneficiaries and their spouses and children and to survivors of
deceased insured workers. See 42 U.S.C. § 401(a).
303. See SMITH, supra note 92, at 40.
304. See id. at 40–41; Social Security Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65
(codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
305. See SMITH, supra note 92, at 41.
306. See Graham, supra note 36, at 17.
307. See SMITH, supra note 92, at 45; Graham, supra note 36, at 16.
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policy recommendations. While the president would lose the ability to
determine the exact nature of the recommendations, the added credibility of
the recommendations coming from the commission should help to gain
public support for their implementation.
Finally, the new commission should draw on some of the lessons learned
from the Kerner Commission on how to increase commission
effectiveness.308 For example, a commission will be most successful when
(1) its final report provides concrete proposals that receive presidential and
congressional support rather than broad sweeping recommendations, (2) it
develops well-supported findings and recommendations, and (3) the
recommendations are politically feasible for both parties.309
The
commission should avoid broad proposals that may exceed legislative
capabilities, as the wide scope of the Kerner Commission’s recommendations
may have been key to their ultimate dismissal by President Johnson.310 A
bipartisan commission focused on developing policies addressing the chilling
effects of anti-riot provisions on peaceful protestors would be sufficiently
clear and narrow and could recommend specific policy changes that seek to
achieve concrete and measurable results. By taking lessons from the Kerner
Commission, a new commission could seek to not merely reiterate the same
analysis and the same recommendations that are already a part of the
dialogue, but rather produce useful, new information that is measurable over
time.311
CONCLUSION
The federal government should not ignore that anti-riot provisions have
become critical parts of federal and state legislators’ attempts to diminish the
voices of protestors. Despite the courts’ application of the severability clause
in Miselis and Rundo, partisan divisiveness has led to congressional inaction
where no effective measure has been adopted to address violent protests.
Concurrently, policy makers promoting public safety and safeguarding the
freedom of expression should not dissociate these matters from their
sociolegal context. The regularity with which policy makers discuss the
deterrence of protests today, coupled with the passage of anti-riot provisions
in several states, has only continued to chill free speech. The federal
government should not discount this veiled attack on constitutional freedoms.
The failure to investigate the potentially dangerous and discriminatory
practices of anti-riot provisions has led to a lack of information on their
impact, leaving citizens with anecdotal evidence to argue in their defense.
Protestors understand that overbroad and vague statutes could have the
effect of criminalizing protected speech for law-abiding citizens. While
Congress has not heeded the federal judiciary’s suggestion to amend the
Act’s text, the three branches of government have also not presented a united
308.
309.
310.
311.

See supra notes 87–91 and accompanying text.
See SMITH, supra note 92, at 45.
See supra Part I.A.; Graham, supra note 36, at 9.
See KERNER REPORT, supra note 34, at 265.
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front against preventing violent public disturbances. Policy arguments on
both sides are persuasive; however, this Note contends that the ambiguous
intentions of anti-riot provisions need to be resolved with the establishment
of a presidential commission to adequately gather evidence. These
discoveries, in turn, would guide the president to either implement executive
action or recommend a legislative response, and the ultimate effectiveness
from such presidential support is critical to address the harmful effects of
anti-riot provisions.

